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Flight initiation distance (FID), the distance at which an organism flees from an 
approaching threat, is an ecological metric of cost-benefit functions of escape 
decisions.  We adapted the FID paradigm to investigate how fast or slow attacking 
‘virtual predators’ constrain escape decisions. We show that rapid escape decisions 
rely on ‘reactive fear’ circuits in the periaqueductal gray and midcingulate cortex 
(MCC), while protracted escape decisions, defined by larger buffer zones, were 
associated with ‘cognitive fear’ circuits which include posterior cingulate cortex, 
hippocampus and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, circuits implicated in 
strategic avoidance and behavioral flexibility. Using a Bayesian Decision Model, we 
further show that optimization of escape decisions under rapid flight were localized 
to the MCC, a region involved in adaptive motor control, while the hippocampus is 
implicated in optimizing decisions that update and control slower escape initiation. 
These results demonstrate an unexplored link between defensive survival circuits 
and their role in adaptive escape decisions. 
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Significance  
Humans, like other animals, have evolved a set of circuits whose primary function is survival.  In 
the case of predation, these circuits include ‘reactive fear’ circuits involved in fast and immediate 
escape decisions and ‘cognitive fear’ circuits that are involved in the conscious feeling of threat as 
well as slow strategic escape.  Using neuroimaging combined with computational modeling, we 
support this differentiation of fear circuits by showing that fast escape decisions are elicited by 
the periaqueductal gray and MCC, regions involved in reactive flight. Conversely, slower escape 
decisions rely on the hippocampus, posterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex, a circuit 
implicated in behavioral flexibility.  These results support the role of the defensive survival 
circuitry in escape decisions and a separation of fear into reactive and cognitive circuits.  
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Introduction 
Survival depends on the adaptive capacity to balance fitness promoting behaviors such as 
copulation and foraging with the omnipresent risk of lethal predatory attack (Cooper and 
Blumstein, 2015; Mobbs and Kim, 2015). In the field of behavioral ecology, this balance between 
survival behaviors is depicted by economic models of flight initiation distance (FID) that capture 
risk functions by measuring the distance at which an organism flees from an approaching threat, 
while considering the cost of fleeing (Ydenberg and Dill, 1986; 2015). A wealth of ethological 
literature demonstrates that prey are remarkably adept at escape and make decisions based on 
the predator’s directionality, lethality, velocity, and prior encounters with the predator 
(Stankowich and Blumstein, 2005). In addition to its capacity to measure adaptive behavior, FID 
is a well-established index of threat sensitivity resulting in large variability within and between 
species. Despite being applied to a large variety of taxa, this reliable measure has not been used 
to identify heterogeneity in threat sensitivity or escape decisions in humans, and the neural 
circuits remain unexplored.  
         Theoretical and neuroanatomical models support the existence of an interconnected 
defensive survival circuitry that is remarkably preserved across species (Blanchard and 
Blanchard, 1990; Panksepp, 1998, 2011; Price, 2005). Under the conditions of immediate danger, 
the ‘reactive fear’  circuitry is evoked midbrain PAG, central amygdala (CeA), hypothalamus and 
the midcingulate cortex (MCC) relay, update and initiate essentially innate reactions including 
motor responses such as flight and freezing (Panksepp, 2011; Shackman et al., 2011; Gross and 
Canteras, 2012; Tovote et al., 2016). Conversely, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), hippocampus and basolateral amygdala, a collective set of 
regions that constitute the ‘cognitive fear” circuitry, promote behavioral flexibility, strategic 
decision-making and avoidance (McNaughton and Corr, 2004; Mobbs and Kim, 2015; Price, 
2005; LeDoux and Pine, 2016). Although few behavioral ecologists have considered the 
neurophysiology underlying escape decisions, some have proposed similar dichotomies 
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suggesting that fast, but inaccurate decisions are processed by subcortical regions, while slow, but 
accurate decisions are processed by cortical system (Trimmer et al., 2008). Cognitive and reactive 
fear circuits work in harmony by adaptively switching between survival circuits to engage the most 
optimal strategy to maximize survival (LeDoux, 2012; Davis et al., 2010; Mobbs et al., 2015). 
        Excitation and inhibition between these circuits is determined by the spatiotemporal distance 
to the threat (Blanchard and Blanchard, 1990; Halladay and Blair, 2015; McNaughton and Corr, 
2004; Mobbs et al., 2015).  For example, distant threat often results in freezing and threat 
assessment, yet when the threat is close active flight and fight are observed. Distance to the threat, 
therefore, is crucial in choosing the best escape strategy. Evidence suggests that this is conserved 
across species. In humans, active escape tasks have been used, where the goal of the subject is to 
escape from a virtual looming threat – a red dot with the capacity to chase, capture and shock the 
subject in a virtual maze.  Functional MRI results show that when a threat is distant, there is 
increased activity in the vmPFC, PCC and BLA.  However, as the threat moves closer, there is a 
switch to increased activity in the central amygdala (CeA), MCC and PAG (Mobbs et al., 2007, 
2010). These, and related studies, however, have failed to investigate the neural basis of escape 
decisions (i.e. flight initiation) or exam the computational mechanisms that underlie escape 
decisions to changing attack distances. 
         We developed a paradigm from which to investigate how the defensive survival circuitry 
facilitates escape decisions when subjects encounter fast or slow attacking threats (Fig 1A). In this 
task, participants encountered virtual predators of three colors, each representing different attack 
distances (AD). On each trial, the actual AD was drawn from a Gaussian distribution that was 
unique to the particular predator type. Fast AD predators (i.e. far or early attacking) were 
characterized by the virtual predator quickly switching from slow approach to fast attack velocity, 
therefore requiring the subject to make quick escape decisions. On the other hand, slow AD 
predators (i.e. close or late attacking) slowly approached for longer time periods resulting in larger 
buffer zones leading to more time to strategize escape. (Note that “fast” and “slow” here describe 
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the timing of the predator attack, not the speed of the predators) The goal of the task is to try and 
successfully escape, while at the same time, attempt to acquire as much money as possible by 
fleeing as late as possible (Fig. 1B). Using this task, we propose several hypotheses: (i) for fast 
escape decisions, we expect to see activity in the ‘Reactive Fear’ circuitry, while slow escape 
decisions will reveal more pronounced activity in the ‘Cognitive Fear’ circuitry; (ii) using a 
Bayesian decision model where subjects’ preference to reward and avoidance to punishment are 
considered, we predict that the fear and anxiety circuitry will play a role in facilitating fast and 
slow escape decisions, respectively.  
 
Results 
Behavior 
We first examined the behavioral data by applying a repeated-measure three-way ANOVA 
(Predator Type X Reward Level X Shock Level) for escape responses (e.g. FIDs). Results showed 
a main effect of predator type (F(2,54) = 82.59, p < .001).  Posthoc comparisons for the predator 
type X shock level interaction revealed that the difference in FID choices between high and low 
shock levels only exist in the slow attacking predator condition (p = 0.013). This shows that 
subjects considered the level of potential danger while choosing FID (more risk-averse when 
shock is higher), but only when considering the slow attacking threat where there was time for 
strategic planning. The same repeated-measure three-way ANOVA was performed for escape 
difficulty ratings. A main effect of predator type was found (F(2,54) = 49.77, p < .001), showing 
that subjects estimate fast attacking predator as the most difficult predator type to escape (all 
posthoc comparisons: p < .001). Significant interactions were found for predator type X shock 
level (F(2,54) = 13.68, p < .001) and predator Type X reward level (F(2,54) = 4.39, p = .017). For 
the predator type X shock level interaction, we found that rating was higher in the high shock 
condition, but only in the slow attacking predator (posthoc comparison: p < .001). This is 
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intriguing because the predator’s attack distance is identical in both shock levels, yet subjects 
perceived the threat to be more difficult to escape in the high shock condition (see Fig. S1).   
 
Neural basis of fast and slow escape decisions 
We next investigated the neural basis of escape decisions for the fast and slow attacking threat. In 
order to control for timing differences between conditions, besides modelling the rest of the trial 
as a boxcar function, we specifically looked at the 2s before the FID bottom press as a period 
where subjects form their final decisions. We chose to time lock 2s before the flight decision for 
two main reasons: (i) because it allowed us to examine the neural ramping up of the flight decision, 
and controlled for the contamination of outcome; (ii) reduced the amount or trials that would be 
lost for the fast attack condition.  Also, to control for any confounds of pain, we excluded the 
caught trials (Number of caught trials: far attacking predator: mean = 8 ±  SD =3; mid attacking 
predator: mean =5 ± 2; near attacking predator: mean = 4 ±1), using these events as regressors of 
no interest. As the mid AD condition was a priori used an anchor for the fast and slow AD threats, 
we focus on activity for the fast and slow AD (see SOM for further results). A whole brain analysis 
was first performed to locate regions associated with decisions under reactive fear (fast attacking 
predators) and cognitive fear (slow attacking predators). Detailed regions of activation can be 
found in Table S1 – S2.  As shown in Fig. 2, with data extracted from independent anatomical 
ROIs differential activation patterns were clearly found for the different predator ADs (See SOM 
for a full list of activated regions). In order to confirm the dissociation between the reactive and 
cognitive fear systems (represented by PAG and vmPFC respectively), we computed a two-way 
ANOVA (region X predator type) using signal change drawn from independent ROIs from PAG 
and vmPFC. There was a main effect of region (F = 5.77, p = .017) and a significant interaction 
between region and predator type (F = 11.50, p < .001) . For the Fast AD > Control contrast, we 
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observed increased activity in PAG and MCC. A direct comparison between high vs low shock for 
the fast AD predator revealed increased activity in the PAG, suggesting that PAG is evoked when 
the threat is high (see table S7).  
       On the other hand, the slow AD > Control revealed increased activity in the cognitive fear 
circuitry including the vmPFC, PCC and the hippocampus. While no amygdala was observed for 
the main contrast, we did find that a direct comparison between high vs low shock for the slow 
AD predator, showed increased activity in the amygdala and hippocampus (see table S8).  To 
further disentangle the effect and increase the sensitivity of the analysis, we extracted the signal 
changes and BOLD signal time series from the predefined ROIS (i.e. PAG, MCC, vmPFC, PCC, 
hippocampus), regions that have previously been associated with fear, anxiety, and decision 
making under stress (Mobbs et al., 2007).  A conjunction between fast and slow attacking threats 
showed that the medial dorsal thalamus (MDT) was commonly activated.  Although this is an 
exploratory finding, it is intriguingly because MDT is directly or indirectly connected to both fear 
circuits, stimulation of the MDT results in depression or potentiation of both circuits and it is 
thought to play a role in behavioral flexibility (Krout and Loewy, 2000; Vertes et al., 2015).     
 
Computations that support escape decisions 
To explore how the observed FIDs might be understood in terms of rational decision making 
about the costs and benefits of flight, we developed a simple Bayesian decision theoretic model of 
the task. The process by which subjects make escape choices under different predator ADs can be 
decomposed to two steps: 1) Predicting the different predators’ distribution of attack distances, 
by learning from experience and 2) Choosing a FID by comparing the money obtained against the 
risk of shock for each possible FID, in expectation over the predicted attack distance distribution 
and informed by the individual’s subjective preference (utility) levels for shock vs. money. For 
simplicity, we assume a Bayesian ideal observer model of subjects’ learning to estimate the attack 
distances of different predators from trial-by-trial experience, and that FID choices are then 
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determined (with softmax noise) by computing the expected utility (money minus shock) for each 
possible escape distance. Details of the model can be found in the online supporting material. We 
then calculated the distance between utility resulted from subjects’ actual FID and the predicted 
Bayesian ideal FID, which is a measure of optimal performance (Fig. 3).       
         We next examined neural circuits correlated with subjects’ preference parameters in the 
Bayesian decision making model. For a rational player, the preference for reward should be 
positive, while the preference for shock should be negative. Thus, greater reward or shock 
sensitivity here corresponds to larger (positive) 𝛽" and smaller (more negative) 𝛽#. The parametric 
modulation analysis over the [predator > control] contrasts revealed that, for the fast predator 
condition, higher reward sensitivity was associated with activations in bilateral putamen, while 
higher shock sensitivity is associated with engagement in PAG and bilateral insula. On the other 
hand, for the slow predator condition, right caudate was found to be associated with higher reward 
sensitivity, while PCC was found to be associated with higher shock sensitivity. A display of the 
activated regions can be found in Fig. S3. A detailed layout of the activated regions can be found 
in table S9 and table S10.    
          Next, in order to investigate what neural circuits are responsible for the optimization of 
escape decision making, we considered a measure of performance optimality related to the per-
trial spread between subjects’ actual and Bayesian ideal FIDs. In particular, we computed the 
difference between the actual trial-specific utility 𝑈 𝐹𝐼𝐷  and the maximum (Bayesian optimal) 
utility the subject could possibly get on the trial (𝑈 𝐹𝐼𝐷 ()*), given their estimated subjective 
utilities. A smaller difference (e.g., less regret relative to ideal) implies more consistent Bayesian 
decision making; variation around the ideal FID will increase the difference. The difference on 
every trial were entered as a subject-level parametric modulator separately under each [Predator 
> Control] conditions. For the far predator condition, we found that better Bayesian decision 
making (smaller distance to ideal) was associated with activity in MCC, middle frontal gyrus, and 
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superior motor cortex. On the other hand, better Bayesian decision making in the slow AD 
condition was found to be associated with activity in bilateral hippocampus, as shown in Fig. 4.  
 
Functional connectivity between computationally defined regions         
To investigate the interplay among the brain regions involved in escape decision optimization, a 
functional connectivity analysis was performed for the response phase (escape decision) using a 
generalized psychophysiological interactions (PPI) approach (McLaren et al., 2012); In order to 
confirm the patterns observed in the whole brain flexible model, we first adopted independent 
seed regions of MCC and hippocampus from previous research (Mobbs et al., 2007). For the 
contrast of Fast Predator > Control, we showed a significant coupling between the MCC seed, the 
PAG, motor cortex and bilateral thalamus. For the contrast of slow Predator > Control, we showed 
a significant coupling between the hippocampus seed and PCC. This suggest that when the 
subjects are provided time for decision flexibility, they use a search and employ approach which 
prepares them for action, as shown in figure 4.  
 
Discussion 
We have demonstrated that subjects apply different nodes of the survival circuitry when escaping 
fast or slow attacking threats.  Our analysis revealed increased activity in ‘reactive fear’ circuits 
namely the PAG and the MCC for the fast AD predator, regions that are implicated in response to 
fast and imminent threats. Supporting comparative work (An et al., 1998), connectivity analysis 
revealed a significant couple between the MCC and PAG and recent animal work has shown that 
the optogenetic activation of glutamatergic neurons in the dorsal lateral PAG induce motor 
responses (e.g. flight; Tovote et al., 2016). The MCC is also a critical component of the defensive 
survival circuitry and has afferent projections to the ventral striatum, receives efferents from the 
medial dorsal thalamus and has bidirectional projections with the amygdala (Shackman et al., 
2011). It has also been suggested that control signals in the MCC may resolve conflict between 
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defensive strategies (e.g. freezing or fleeing).  This has led to the theory that the cells in the MCC 
are involved in linking motor centers with defensive circuits (Shackman et al., 2011).  
         Our analysis for the slow attacking threat contrast revealed activation in three key areas of 
the ‘cognitive fear’ circuitry: the vmPFC, hippocampus and PCC. Structural and function 
connectivity between these structures has been shown in humans and primates, supporting  
conserved pathways across species (Price, 2005). Primate research has found that the primate 
PCC responds to risky decision-making and scales with the degree of risk (McCoy and Platt, 
2005). The PCC is also correlated with a salience signal reflecting the deviation from the standard 
option, suggesting a role in the flexible allocation of neural resources (Heilbronner et al., 2011). 
The goal of the PCC may be to harvest information for escape decisions under conditions of 
protracted threat. This fits with the proposal that through its connections with the hippocampus, 
the PCC may integrate memory guided decisions with current decision processes which may 
involve a ‘preparation for action’ through rumination and worry.    
       The vmPFC is also a key player in the defensive survival circuitry. Single-cell recordings in 
rodents have shown that the mPFC contains ‘strategy selective’ cells, which are thought to be 
involved in the coordination of defensive responses (Halladay and Blair, 2015). This fits with the 
idea that the mPFC plays a role in selecting adaptive strategies that are mapped onto motor 
responses. Indeed, work in humans shows that larger buffer distances are associated with activity 
in the vmPFC and decreased activity in this regions is associated with panic related motor actions 
(Mobbs et al., 2010; Perkins et al., 2015). Our data builds on these findings by showing that 
vmPFC, hippocampus and PCC form a strategic and flexible decisions when the agent has time to 
contemplate the best escape action. Our findings support the role of the survival circuitry by 
proposing that ‘fast’ fear reactions engage a neural circuits involved in reactive fear, while ‘slower’ 
escape decisions are associated with strategic avoidance and conscious cognitive fear (LeDoux 
and Pine, 2016).  
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        Our Bayesian model also provides insights into how the distinct regions of the survival 
circuits associated with optimal escape. Two core regions where associated with optimal escape.  
The MCC for the fast attacking threat and the hippocampus for the slow attacking threat. While it 
is accepted that the PAG needs input to make optimal decisions, it is unclear where this input 
comes from.  A few candidates exist, among them is the MCC.  The MCC is highly connected to 
the lateral PAG and according to adaptive control theory is a “central hub” where information 
about reinforcements are passed to motor control areas to coordinate goal directed behaviors 
(Shackman et al., 2011).  Our connectivity results support this conclusion showing that the MCC 
was coupled with activity in the PAG and the motor cortex. This proposes that the MCC is one 
candidate region for the integration of current goals and implement aversively motivated 
instrumental motor behaviors (i.e. when to flee a threat (Shackman et al., 2011)).  
         The hippocampus has been identified as a central processing regions involved in  approach-
avoidance conflict and corresponding choice monitoring (Loh et al., 2016). Theorists have 
proposed that the hippocampus computes comparators that assess multiple goals and in turn 
correct actions (McNaughton and Gray, 2000) possibly through a flexible constructive process 
involved in problem solving (Hassabis and Maguire, 2007). When there is time to gather 
information, the hippocampus may play a role in drawing on previous threat encounters to 
optimize current actions. Indeed, the hippocampus plays a role in spatial and temporal ‘where’ 
and ‘when’ memory and has theoretically been linked to escape decisions (Litvin et al., 2015) and 
may possibly by resolving conflict between fitness promoting behaviors (e.g. escape vs 
reward;(Bach et al., 2014). The ventral hippocampus is particularly interesting given its role in 
emotion.  The ventral hippocampus is connected to the vmPFC, basolateral amygdala and the bed 
nucleus of the stria terminalis and is believed to contribute to the control of behavior under 
anxiogenic conditions (Bannerman et al., 2004). Our connectivity results support this conclusion 
showing that the hippocampus was also coupled with activity in the PCC, a region thought to be 
involved in adaptive decisions (Pearson et al., 2011).   Together, these theories support a Bayesian 
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role for the hippocampus, where it gathers information to optimize directed escape during slow, 
but not fast, attacking threat. 
         In summary, we introduce a paradigm that allows researchers to map escape decisions onto 
the defensive survival circuitry. This circuit can be separated into a fast ‘reactive fear’ circuit 
involved in escape decision when time is limited and ‘slower ‘cognitive fear’ circuits are involved 
in the strategic avoidance and conscious feelings of fear when the agent has time to think.  More 
specifically, sections of these circuits differentially optimize escape decisions with the MCC 
centered on making fast decisions associated with imminent threat and the hippocampus in slow 
strategic decisions that are characterized by protracted threat assessment. These results provide 
a new window in the role of the defensive survival circuitry in adaptive escape decisions and 
transform the way we view the neural circuits involved in human fear.   
 
Methods 
Participants 
A total number of 30 subjects completed informed consent in accordance with the guide lines of 
the Columbia University Institutional Review Board and were remunerated for their 
participation. Data from 1 subject was lost due to computer error. One additional subject was 
excluded due to excessive movement during the scan. Our final sample consisted of 28 subjects 
(17 women, Age = 25.4 ± 7.3 years).    
 
Experiment Design 
Subjects were scanned while they viewed stimuli on the screen. The screen displayed a 2D run 
way, with a virtual predator “attacking” from the left entrance. In the current paradigm, the goal 
of the subject was to escape the attack from a certain virtual predator, by pressing a bottom at the 
desired timing. Once the bottom was pressed, a triangle representing the subject started moving 
towards a “safety exit”. Subjects gained reward if they escaped to the safety before the predator 
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caught them; On the other hand, they were given a mildly aversive electric shock if they were 
caught. The goal of the game was to choose the right time to flee meaning acquiring the maximum 
amount of reward while still escaping the virtual predator.  To accomplish this, reward in each 
trial scaled with time spent before pressing the bottom. The longer subjects stay (the smaller the 
FID), the more reward they get. But staying too long could mean receiving an electric shock from 
the predator.          
        The runway has a total length of 90 units, where the prey is placed 10 unites to the safety 
exit. While in the approaching mode, the predator proceeds with a speed of 4 units/second; while 
in the chasing mode, the predator proceeds with a speed of 10 unites/second. The reward 
participants get on every trial is positively correlated with the length they stay. A total number of 
96 trials exist in the current paradigm, factorial divided to cover different predator attack distances, 
shock level and reward levels (3 X 2 X 2). Subjects were first presented with a screen indicating 
which type of predator and shock/reward level will be presented in the next trial for 2s. This 
shock/reward indicator informs the next 4 trials. Next the trial begins, where subjects observes an 
artificial predator slowly looms towards their triangle. After a designated time period, which is 
learned by the participant, the artificial predator will attack by speeding up (i.e. the attack distance) 
when it reaches a designated position. There are 4 types of attacking predators, with their attack 
distances subject to 3 Gaussian distributions (i.e. fast attacking predator, mid attacking predator, 
slow attacking predator, and control predator; See Fig.1 for details). As the threat slowly looms 
towards them, the subjects determine their initiation of flight by pressing the FID button. To make 
sure reaction time plays no role in FIDs, we manipulated the speed of the predator and the subject 
so that once the threat speeds up to attack, it is impossible to escape. After the trial, subjects are 
required to rate the difficulty of escape using a visual analogue (1-5) scale. A detailed breakdown 
of the experimental procedure can be seen in Fig.1.  The experiment consists of a total number of 
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96 trials. After 48 trials, the assignment of predator-color relationship was altered to introduce 
novelty and avoid the fixation of subject strategies.  
Before the start of the actual experiment, subjects went through a brief practice session of 8 
trials to familiarize themselves with the paradigm. In the practice session, subjects played the 
same game, but the predators’ attack distances were drawn from different distributions than the 
ones in the actual experiment.   
 
Behavioral Analysis 
Due to the relative simplicity of our task and exposure to a practice session, subjects’ performance 
reached saturation very quickly after the beginning of the experiment. By “saturation”, subjects 
quickly formed their own patterns of choice making and carry through the rest of the experiment. 
Thus, instead of looking at trial-by-trial changes of the FID, we focus on the differences of FID 
between different predator conditions, and approaches subjects’ learning behavior by Bayesian 
modeling (described later).  
 Subjects’ choice of FID, reward from the trial, and escapability ratings were collected on 
each trial. We used repeated-measures three-way ANOVAs (of Predator Type X Reward Level X 
Shock Level) to assess differences in FID, reward and escapability ratings between the various 
conditions. 
 
Acquisition and Analysis of fMRI data 
 
All fMRI data were acquired using a GE Discovery MR750 3.0 T scanner with 32-channel headcoil. 
The imaging session consisted of two function scans, each twenty minutes, as well as a high-
resolution anatomical T1-weighted image (1mm isotropic resolution) collected at the beginning of 
each scan session. For functional imaging, interleaved T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo planar 
imaging (EPI) sequences were used to produce 45 3-mm-thick oblique axial slices (TR = 2 sec., 
TE = 25 ms, flip angle = 77°, FOV = 192 x 192 mm, matrix = 64 x 64). Each functional run began 
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with five volumes (1000 msec) before the first stimulus onset. These volumes were discarded 
before entering analysis to allow for magnetic field equilibration. Stimulus were presented using 
Cogent (matlab-based package). Participants viewed the screen via a mirror mounted on the head 
coil, and a pillow and foam cushions were placed inside the coil to minimize head movement.   
Analysis of fMRI data was carried out using scripted batches in SPM8 software (Welcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Lon-don, UK; http://www/fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in 
Matlab 7 (The MathWorks Inc., Natick MA). Structural images were subjected to the unified 
segmentation algorithm implemented in SPM8, yielding discrete cosine transform spatial warping 
coefficients used to normalize each individual’s data into MNI space.  Functional data were first 
corrected for slice timing difference, and subsequently realigned to account for head movements. 
Normalized data were finally smoothed with a 6-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.  
Preprocessed imaged were subjected to a two-level general linear model using SPM8. The 
first level contained the following regressors of interest, each convolved with the canonical two-
gamma hemodynamic response function: a 2-second box-car function for the onset of the trial 
(where the color of the incoming predator is shown); a 4-8 second (duration jittered) box-car 
function from the onset to 2s before when subjects make the flight decision; a 2-second box-car 
function for the phase before subjects make the flight decision; a 4-8 second (duration jittered) 
box-car function for the remainder of the trial. Mean-centered trait anxiety ratings, escapability 
ratings and parameters in the Bayesian decision model were included as orthogonal regressors. In 
addition, regressors of no interest consisted of motion parameters determined during 
preprocessing, their first temporal derivative and discrete cosine transform-based temporal low 
frequency drift regressors with a cutoff of 192-seconds.  
Beta maps were used to create linear contrast maps, which were then subjected to second-
level, random-effects one-sample t tests. In Addition, A flexible factorial model was used to 
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examine the main effects of predator type, reward level and shock level. Interaction effects 
between predator type, reward level and shock level were also examined using the factorial model. 
The resulting statistical maps were thresholded at P < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons 
(false discovery rate [FDR] corrected (Genovese et al., 2002)). A flexible factorial model was used 
to examine the interaction effects between predator type, reward level and shock level. The 
threshold for those specific contrasts was set at p < 0.05 (FDR corrected).  
A hypothesis driven region of interest (ROI) analysis were performed after the whole brain 
analysis for regions with strong a priori spatial hypotheses. The ROI analysis was performed using 
regions associated with the processing of fear, threat and decision making. Independent ROIs 
were chosen from previous research showing similar effects(Mobbs et al., 2007; Tedeschi et al., 
2015). The threshold for these analyses was set at p < 0.05, small volume correction (SVC).  
  The functional connectivity analysis was performed for the response phase (escape 
decision) using a generalized psychophysiological interactions (PPI) approach. The connectivity 
analysis was carried out based on the [predator condition > control condition] contrast.    
 
Bayesian Decision Making Model 
In order to better understand and characterize the process by which subjects learn the nature of 
the predators and the subsequent adjustment of their strategies, we applied a Bayesian learning 
model to simulate how subjects adapt to attacks from different predators. In the FID task, each 
predator type (far, mid and close) had a predefined location of attack. These attack distances were 
subject to three Gaussian distributions, corresponding to the three predator types, as mentioned 
before. As we shall see in the following section, the modeled ideal Bayesian learner will update 
its belief (posterior) about the next attacking distance by combining observations (likelihood) of 
attacks and an earlier belief (prior) using the Bayes rule, which is the statistical principle of 
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reasoning with evidence and belief. The updated belief will then inform the optimal choice of the 
flight initiation distance (FID), in order to win money and avoid shock. 
Naturally, subjects base their flight choices on the predicted attacking distance of the current 
trial. At first, subjects have zero to minimum knowledge about the color-predator associations, 
and each predator’s defined range of attacks. However, as the experiment progresses, subjects 
accumulate knowledge about the predators, and form better predictions of the attack distance for 
the current trial after seeing the corresponding predator color. Thus, the task is modeled as a 
process where subjects learn towards the true distribution of the attack distance.  
A priori to observing attacking, the attack distance of a certain predator is believed to be 
drawn from a Gaussian distribution 𝐴𝐷|𝑐	  ~	  𝑁 𝜇 2 , 𝜎" , where 𝑐 represents the predator type. At 
the start of the experiment, the mean parameters are unknown and hence assumed to follow the 
same prior distribution. Here we adopt the conjugate prior distribution  𝜇(2)	  ~	  𝑁 𝜇7, 𝜎7"  with a 
large variance to reflect minimum prior knowledge. Meanwhile, we assume the variance of 
likelihood (𝜎") to be known, because in the practice phase subjects have already been exposed to 
predators with identical AD variance as in the formal experiment. 
Upon observing attacks, the posterior distribution for the mean parameter is updated by the 
Bayes rule, yielding: 
 𝑝 𝜇 2 | 𝐴𝐷9 2 ∝ 𝑁 𝜇 2 𝜇7, 𝜎7" 𝑁 𝐴𝐷9 2 𝜇 2 , 𝜎7"9 = 𝑁 𝜇 2 𝜇<2 , 𝜎<2 " , 
 
where 𝐴𝐷9 2  are the observed distances of a total number of 𝑛 attacks from type-𝑐 
predators. The posterior is also a Gaussian, with parameters updated through 1 𝜎<2 " = 1 𝜎7" +
𝑛(2) 𝜎" and  <2 = 𝜎<2 " @ABAC + DEF(G)F BC . This posterior of the mean parameter directly induces the 
(posterior) predictive distribution of the upcoming attack distance, given by 
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𝑝 𝐴𝐷<H#(2) 𝐴𝐷9 2 = 𝑁 𝐴𝐷<H#(2) 𝜇 2 , 𝜎7" 𝑝 𝜇 2 | 𝐴𝐷9 2 𝑑𝜇 2 = 𝑁 𝜇<2 , 𝜎<2 " + 𝜎" . 
 
 
An ideal Bayesian learner will base its FID choice on this distribution. Now, under the context 
of the current paradigm, a subject chooses FID from a finite set of options by trading off two 
critical factors: the risk of getting shocked and the monetary reward. With a large FID, risk is 
reduced while less reward will be given; with a small FID, the opposite. We then define an overall 
utility as a weighted combination of the two factors:  
 𝑢 𝐹𝐼𝐷, 𝐴𝐷 = 𝛽#𝑰 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽"𝑀 𝐹𝐼𝐷 1 − 𝑰 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 . 
 
 
The coefficients 𝛽#, 𝛽" are individuals-specific weights to adjust the preference between the 
two factors. 𝑰(𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡) is the indicator function for the event of getting caught and killed (evaluates 
to 1 if caught, 0 otherwise); and 𝑀(𝐹𝐼𝐷) is the amount of money rewarded if escape is successful. 
This utility is a random function since getting caught is a random event --- the optimal decision 
should then be based on the expected value of utility, namely the Bayesian risk, which is 
estimated from the latest posterior predictive distribution and takes the form of 
 𝑈 𝐹𝐼𝐷 = 𝔼	  𝑢 𝐹𝐼𝐷, 𝐴𝐷 = 𝛽# Pr 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝐹𝐼𝐷 + 𝛽"𝑀 𝐹𝐼𝐷 1 − Pr 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡|𝐹𝐼𝐷 . 
 
Here the probability of being caught Pr 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝐹𝐼𝐷  can be computed by solving a simple 
chasing problem, where the actual speed of the particular predator and subject were taken into 
computation to determine if the subject would be caught or not.  
 
The Bayesian learner’s optimal choice is set as a reference to measure the performance of 
subjects. Clearly, the optimal FID is one that maximizes 𝑈 𝐹𝐼𝐷 . Yet, the behavior of a human 
player is also influenced by unobserved factors such as personality traits and is not necessarily 
Bayesian optimal. To quantify individual differences of decision making through coefficients 
.CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licensepeer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/207936doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Oct. 23, 2017; 
 20 
(𝛽#, 𝛽"), we fit a discrete choice model (multinomial logit) for each subject, which assumes that 
the probability of picking an option is proportional to the corresponding exponential utility:  
 Pr 𝐹𝐼𝐷 = 𝑥 = exp 𝑈 𝐹𝐼𝐷 = 𝑥exp 𝑈 𝐹𝐼𝐷 = 𝑦[∈	  2]^92_` . 
 
The coefficients can be estimated by maximizing the overall likelihood, namely  
 𝛽#, 𝛽" = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥	   Pr 𝐹𝐼𝐷9 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠	  𝐴𝐷h𝑠9 , 
 
where the product is taken over trials. By fitting to our data, a subject can be quantified by 
the corresponding coefficients: 𝛽# (pain): expected to be non-positive, and a bigger absolute value means stronger aversion 
towards risk and its associated penalty (electric shock). 𝛽" (money): expected to be non-negative, and a bigger value measures stronger favor of 
monetary reward.  −𝛽#/𝛽": the relative weight between the two factors, which conceptually means the 
maximum amount of money one is willing to pay to avoid being caught (and shocked) once 
Those parameters are then entered into fMRI parametric modulation analysis to determine 
the brain regions where signals covariate with the parameters. Results of the modulation analysis 
are discussed in the next section.   
On every particular trial, the difference between the actual utility 𝑈 𝐹𝐼𝐷  and the Bayesian 
optimal utility 𝑈(𝐹𝐼𝐷)()* is calculated as a measure of choice optimality (Alternatively, the 
“utility” used to calculated differences here can be “normalized” by dividing out 𝛽", the reward 
preference parameter.  
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Fig. 1. Experimental procedures, Ydenberg and Dill model and distribution of 
escape decisions. A): Subjects are told whether their decisions will result in high or low 
reward or shock.  They are then, presented with the image of the virtual predator where 
the color signals the attack distance (2s). (e.g. blue = fast, red = slow).  After a short 
interval, the virtual predator appears at the end of the runway and slowly move towards 
the subject’s triangle. After an unspecified amount of time (e.g. 4-10s) the artificial 
predator will attack the subject’s virtual triangle exit (i.e. attack distance). To escape, the 
subject must flee before the predator attacks. If the subject is caught, they will receive a 
tolerable, yet aversive, shock to the back of the hand. Trials end when the predator reaches 
the subject or the exit. To motivate longer fleeing time, the task will include an economic 
manipulation, where subjects will obtain more money the longer they stay in the starting 
position and lose money the earlier they enter the safety exit. After each trial, the subject 
is asked to report how difficult they found it to escape the virtual predator (4s). B) 
Modified schematic representation from the model proposed by Ydenberg and Dill [1]. As 
the distance between the prey and the predator decreases, the cost of fleeing decays, while 
the cost of not fleeing rises. D* represents an optimal point where the prey should flee. C) 
Histograms showing the distribution of subjects’ FID choices for early, mid and late 
attacking predators respectively. The X axis represents FID, while the Y axis represents 
frequency of choice.    
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Fig. 2. Main regions of interest and signal changes associated with fast and slower 
attacking threats. Parameter estimates and time series extracted from A) midbrain, B) MCC, 
C) vmPFC D) PCC and E) the hippocampus. Activations shown in the graph show clusters from 
the whole brain activation, while the signal change data were extracted from independent 
anatomical ROIs. The upper graph displays parameter estimates. Y axis represents percent signal 
changes, and X axis is the predator type. The lower graph display time series extracted in a course 
of 16 seconds. Blue line: Fast predator; Red line: Slow predator. Beginning of the time series 
represents the time point when the FID event comes online.  
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Fig. 3. Visualization of Bayesian Modelling Results. (A) Bayesian ideal observer estimates 
of predator AD, based on the unknown-mean-known-variance ideal learner model, as a function 
of experience in the task. Color 1 (blue), 2 (yellow), 3 (red), 4 (green) corresponds to fast, mid, 
slow and control predators, respectively. The graph shows the observer’s 95% credible interval 
almost always contains the true mean, indicating an appropriate modeling of uncertainty. (B) 
Relationship between FID and the chance of escape for each predator type. Chance of escape 
increases with FID, but with different growth patterns in every predator type. (C) Estimated 
coefficients for each subject, along with 95% confidence intervals. X axis represents the pain 
coefficient β_1 in the utility function, and Y axis represents the monetary reward coefficient β_2. 
For a rational player, β_2 should be positive (seeking money) and β_1 should be negative 
(avoiding shock). (D) Model fits to observed FIDs. X axis represents trial numbers, and Y axis 
represents FID. Ideal FID choices predicted by the ideal Bayesian observer (lines), subjects’ actual 
FID choice (dots), and the difference between them in terms of utility under estimated individual 
preference. Regrets here represents the utility difference between actual chosen FID and the ideal 
Bayesian choice.   
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Fig. 4. Regions, and their connectivity, associated with parametric modulation of 
“distance to ideal”. (A) Brain regions associated with increased Bayesian decision optimality 
in the fast AD condition. Better decision making was associated with increased activity in MCC 
and superior motor cortex. (B) Brain regions associated with decreased distance (increased 
Bayesian decision optimality) in the slow AD condition activated regions include bilateral 
hippocampus and bilateral caudate. A display of the correlation results can be found in Fig. S4. 
(C) Connectivity analysis using MCC as seed over the contrast [fast predator > control]. Positive 
connectivity was found between MCC, motor cortex (MC), thalamus and the PAG. (D) Using the 
hippocampus as seed over the contrast (slow predator > control), positive connectivity was found 
between the hippocampus and PCC. 
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Fig. S1. 
 ANOVA for A) FID, B) Reward and C) Escapability rating.  
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Fig. S2 
Activated regions for 1st level parametric modulation with reward and punishment sensitivity parameters in the 
Bayesian decision making model. 
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Table S1. 
 
Table  S1.  Activation  Table  for  Contrast  [Far  Predator  >                
Control]  (Whole  Brain)    
  
*  P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  
Size  
t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
Far  Predator  >  Control  
Middle  temporal  
Gyrus  
R   461   7.82   48   -­66   6  
Middle  temporal  
Gyrus  
L   155   6.19   -­42   -­69   6  
Precuneus   R   302   5.99   6   -­48   48  
Precentral  Gyrus   L   81   4.52   -­42   -­9   48  
Superior  
Temporal  Gyrus  
L   94   5.11   -­57   -­42   21  
Insula   L   199   4.96   -­33   21   3  
Insula   R   285   6.72   37   20   -­1  
Mid  Cingulate  
Gyrus  
L   71   4.36   -­12   -­21   39  
Midbrain      244   6.51   3   -­28   -­12  
Supplementary  
Motor  Area  
R   357   6.28   17   5   60  
Caudate   R   29   4.67   8   10   -­5  
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Table S2. 
Table  S2.  Activation  Table  for  Contrast  [Close  Predator  >  Control]  (Whole  Brain)  
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
Close  Predator  >  Control  
Middle  temporal  Gyrus   L   724   7.89   -­54   -­18   -­9  
Parahippocampal  Gyrus   R   47   5.51   24   -­12   -­24  
Supplementary  Motor  Area   R   213   5.31   3   -­24   60  
Middle  Frontal  Gyrus   R   26   3.91   33   36   -­18  
Medial  Prefrontal  Cortex   L   77   5.46   -­3   56   -­9  
Insula   L   132   4.24   -­33   -­18   16  
Insula   R   187   4.30   39   -­11   15  
Posterior  Cingulate  Cortex   R   423   5.65   6   -­48   27  
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Table S3. 
Table  S3.  Activation  Table  for  Trial-­by-­trial  parametric  analysis  with  FID    
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
FID  parametric  modulation  +  :  Far  Predator  
Midbrain   L   280   7.80   -­12   27   -­3  
Hippocampus   R   31   7.03   18   -­13   -­13  
Thalamus   L   90   6.87   -­11   -­26   -­1  
Insula   L   63   5.23   -­38   5   -­12  
MCC   L   105   6.94   -­3   2   42  
FID  parametric  modulation  -­  :  Far  Predator  
Middle  Temporal  Gyrus   L   51   3.63   -­51   -­15   -­15  
Middle  Temporal  Gyrus   R   40   3.45   51   -­27   -­15  
Middle  Occipital  Gyrus   R   47   4.07   30   -­90   15  
FID  parametric  modulation  +  :  Close  Predator  
Inferior  Frontal  Gyrus   R   64   4.79   36   21   -­6  
Middle  Frontal  Gyrus   R   93   5.76   39   60   3  
MCC   L   79   4.73   -­1   33   36  
Cerebrum   R   66   7.88   24   -­9   36  
                    
FID  parametric  modulation  -­  :  Close  Predator  
Superior  Temporal  Gyrus   L   29   5.56   -­57   -­51   12  
Inferior  Frontal  Gyrus   L   43   6.46   -­54   27   18  
PCC   L   33   5.19   -­9   -­51   27  
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Table S4. 
Table  S4.  Activation  Table  for  Trial-­by-­trial  parametric  analysis  with  Escapability    
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
Escapability  parametric  modulation  +  :  Fast  Predator  
Middle  Temporal  Gyrus   L   104   7.52   42   -­51   -­21  
Midbrain   R   221   9.20   9   -­30   -­15  
Thalamus   R   75   10.42   12   -­7   3  
Thalamus   L   42   9.54   -­5   -­12   4  
Insula   L   61   9.88   -­41   14   6  
Insula   R   43   9.13   46   9   2  
Escapability  parametric  modulation  -­  :  Fast  Predator  
Parahippocampal  Gyrus   L   24   4.98   -­21   -­12   -­24  
Parahippocampal  Gyrus   R   19   4.21   39   -­39   -­24  
Middle  Frontal  Gyrus   L   48   7.06   -­9   60   6  
Escapability  parametric  modulation  +  :  Slow  Predator  
Middle  Temporal  Gyrus   L   86   5.62   -­57   -­35   -­6  
Insula   R   44   6.23   39   -­14   8  
                    
Superior  Occipital  Gyrus   L   30   4.57   -­14   -­89   19  
Superior  Occipital  Gyrus   R   54   4.24   17   -­88   19  
                    
Escapability  parametric  modulation  -­  :  Slow  Predator  
Middle  Frontal  Gyrus   L   84   7.28   -­30   60   15  
ACC   R   35   8.29   18   42   0  
Caudate   L   14   4.34   -­9   -­51   27  
Caudate   R   20   4.92   14   15   -­3  
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Table S5. 
Table  S5.  Activation  Table  for  Contrast  [High  Reward  >  Low  Reward]  
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y  
High  Reward  >  Low  Reward  
Putamen   L   57   8.42   -­28   -­3  
Putamen   R   50   9.92   36   -­12  
Middle  temporal  gyrus   L   62   11.07   -­60   -­6  
Middle  temporal  gyrus   R   56   9.28   54   -­9  
Inferior  frontal  gyrus   L   49   7.38   -­51   30  
Superior  frontal  gyrus   R   66   7.35   3   54  
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Table S6. 
Table  S6.  Activation  Table  for  Contrast  [High  Shock  >  Low  Shock]  
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
High  Shock  >  Low  Shock  
Superior  temporal  gyrus   L   147   11.16   -­58   3   6  
Insula   L   54   7.36   -­41   -­14   3  
Insula   R   35   6.04   39   3   -­12  
MCC   R   32   5.96   6   -­9   39  
Parahippocampal  gyrus   L   10   9.78   -­24   -­18   -­9  
Hippocampus   R   20   7.55   36   -­15   -­18  
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Table S7. 
Table  S7.  Activation  Table  for  Contrast  [High  Shock  >  Low  Shock]  (Fast  Predator)  
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
High  Shock  >  Low  Shock  (fast  predator)  
Midbrain   L   190   4.95   -­1   -­32   -­13  
ACC   R   179   4.36   3   25   7  
Precuneus   L   335   4.03   -­27   -­54   8  
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Table S8. 
Table  S8.  Activation  Table  for  Contrast  [High  Shock  >  Low  Shock]  (Slow  Predator)  
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
High  Shock  >  Low  Shock  (slow  predator)  
Medial  temporal  gyrus   L   161   4.64   -­42   -­33   0  
Insula   R   25   4.04   40   -­16   10  
Hippocampus   R   36   4.50   21   -­30   -­12  
Superior  temporal  gyrus   R   26   4.30   45   -­12   -­3  
Amygdala   R   17   4.11   24   4   -­20  
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Table S9. 
Table  S9.  Activation  Table  for  Parametric  Modulation  with  Reward  Preference  
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
Parametric  modulation  with  reward  preference  (fast  predator)  
Fusiform  gyrus   L   35   5.75   -­42   -­6   -­27  
Inferior  temporal  gyrus   R   23   4.93   60   -­9   -­18  
Insula   L   80   5.04   -­39   -­12   6  
Putamen   L   42   4.86   -­28   -­18   3  
Middle  temporal  gyrus   L   81   4.11   -­60   -­57   -­3  
Putamen   R   78   4.88   33   -­6   6  
Parametric  modulation  with  reward  preference  (slow  predator)  
Middle  occipital  gyrus   L   85   5.86   -­36   -­66   0  
Caudate   R   50   6.70   15   -­3   15  
Calcarine   R   38   4.79   18   -­48   3  
Insula   R   35   4.48   33   24   3  
Caudate   L   46   4.88   -­9   3   9  
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Table S10. 
Table  S10.  Activation  Table  for  Parametric  Modulation  with  Shock  Avoidance  
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
Parametric  modulation  with  shock  avoidance  (fast  predator)  
Inferior  temporal  gyrus   R   21   4.40   51   -­60   -­18  
Midbrain   R   10   4.93   21   -­18   -­15  
Superior  temporal  gyrus   R   21   4.83   60   -­33   12  
Inferior  frontal  gyrus   L   14   4.16   -­45   42   15  
Parametric  modulation  with  shock  avoidance  (slow  predator)  
PCC   L   23   4.92   -­12   -­39   6  
Thalamus   R   35   6.27   0   -­18   15  
Middle  temporal  gyrus   L   45   4.69   -­42   -­66   15  
Superior  temporal  gyrus   L   48   5.89   -­60   -­45   18  
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Table S11. 
Table  S11.  Activation  Table  for  Parametric  Modulation  with  Bayesian  optimality  
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
Parametric  modulation  with  Bayesian  optimality  (fast  predator)  
ACC   R   24   4.31   6   33   21  
Superior  frontal  gyrus   L   63   4.89   -­24   9   54  
Superior  motor  area   R   18   4.33   12   9   54  
Parametric  modulation  with  Bayesian  optimality  (slow  predator)  
Hippocampus   R   20   4.18   33   -­33   -­3  
Middle  occipital  gyrus   R   12   4.40   36   -­87   -­3  
Precentral  gyrus   R   41   4.32   63   -­3   24  
Precentral  gyrus   L   18   4.05   -­51   -­3   24  
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Table S12. 
Table  S12.  Activation  Table  for  Connectivity  Analysis  
  
P<0.05,  FDR  corrected  
  
  
Brain  Region   Left/Right   Cluster  Size   t-­score   Coordinates  
            x   y   z  
MCC  Seed  
Midbrain   L   19   4.20   -­5   -­30   -­13  
Thalamus   L   25   3.97   -­15   -­13   6  
Thalamus   R   30   4.15   18   -­19   1  
Hippocampus  Seed  
PCC   R   20   4.19   4   -­47   26  
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